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happy skill to arouse the conscience of American families to their civic duty as families.

In Father Huntington's essays on "Philanthropy: Its Success and Failure" and on "Philanthropy and Morality" the people themselves seem to be speaking, voicing at last their needs, confessing their weaknesses, and rebuking the rich. If Miss Addams sympathizes with the humble, Father Huntington is humble. He also more than the other writers seems to be conscious of the laws of social life and the causes of poverty. But it is a little curious that while charity organization finds in this volume a champion in Mr. Bosanquet, the single-tax theory an advocate in Father Huntington, and trades-unions an indulgent friend in Miss Addams, not one of these writers has a word to say in favor of any form of socialism. Were representatives of socialism not invited to speak at the School of Applied Ethics? Or, among cultivated men in America interested in Philanthropy and Social Progress, is there no one in favor of the municipalization or nationalization of capital as well as of land?

Above all other teachings of this volume the idea of the Social Settlement stands out. But, heartily as we approve of the spirit and methods of settlement work, there is, we think, one other defect in the plea for it set forth in this volume besides its omission of the idea of family settlements. This other defect is the failure to make the centre of reform life spring from a group of the working-people themselves. According to Miss Addams, it is to spring from the residents,—from Hull House. But rather does it seem to us that ultimately the life of the working-people must be organized about a centre of their own, where Miss Addams would be their guest, not they hers.

STANTON COIT.

APPEARANCE AND REALITY. A Metaphysical Essay. By F. H. Bradley, LL.D., Glasgow, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. xxiv, 558.

This is a truly great book; and though the discussion of a metaphysical essay does not lie within the scope of the *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, yet there are some points in the volume which demand our attention. The part that concerns us is contained chiefly in Chapter XXV., which is entitled "Goodness," but this

part cannot be fully understood without reference to some other chapters, such as IX., X., XVII., etc. The general character of Mr. Bradley's philosophical position may be briefly indicated as follows: He makes a sharp antithesis between the world of appearance and the world of reality. The essential characteristic of reality is that it must be in harmony with itself. Appearance, on the other hand, is in a state of perpetual self-contradiction. Nevertheless, reality (or the Absolute) is not to be thought of, as by Mr. H. Spencer, as something entirely unknowable\* behind the world of appearance. "Reality appears in its appearances, and they are its revelation. . . . Reality comes into knowledge, and the more we know of anything the more in one way is reality present within us" (p. 552). Reality is, as it were, simply appearance straightened out, appearance made consistent with itself. It must not be opposed to experience or to the nature of our self-conscious life. "Reality is one experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations. Its character is the opposite of that fabled extreme which is barely mechanical, and it is, in the end, the sole perfect realization of spirit. . . . Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and the more that anything is spiritual so much the more is it veritably real." This last remark evidently involves a conception of *Degrees of Reality*,—i.e., it involves the idea that a thing may be more or less real. This idea is worked out with great force and suggestiveness in Chapter XXIV., and is perhaps the most original and characteristic feature of the book.

To attempt to criticise Mr. Bradley's working out of this position would evidently carry us beyond our province, but a few remarks are necessary. Mr. Bradley's general attitude is closely related to that of Hegel. The difference seems to lie chiefly in the sharper contrast which Mr. Bradley draws between the Absolute and its revelation. With Hegel the Absolute is necessarily self-revealing: its essence involves a process. This process contains self-contradiction, and it is the dialectic arising from this self-contradiction which is the nerve of the movement. With Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, the process appears to be non-essential, and the self-contradiction is merely something to be got rid of. Mr. Bradley's

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\* On Spencer's worship of the unknowable Mr. Bradley has a highly characteristic joke. Mr. Spencer's attitude, he says (p. 128), "seems a proposal to take something for God simply and solely because we do not know what the devil it can be."

view, in fact, approximates to that of Spinoza. Spinoza's Absolute has been compared to a lion's den. All the tracks converge to it: none issues out. So with Mr. Bradley. Self-contradiction has to be got rid of. Appearance has to be straightened out. Thus we get to the Absolute, to reality. What seems to be not sufficiently answered on Mr. Bradley's view is the question, how there ever comes to be a self-contradiction at all, why reality appears; in other words, what is the origin of evil. Nor, indeed, does the difficulty in Mr. Bradley's system end here. The idea of reality which he opposes to appearance is itself an appearance. The idea of the Absolute is not the Absolute, and so far as it is not the Absolute, it is false. How, then, can it be taken as the standard by which appearance is judged?

I may say, generally, that Mr. Bradley's metaphysical work impresses me as being fragmentary. He raises particular problems which could not really be solved without being brought into a more systematic connection with one another than Mr. Bradley attempts. We feel the want, on the one hand, of a dialectic like that of Hegel, by which the various points might be brought into relation to one another; and, on the other hand (if, indeed, this is not the same thing), of what may be described as Epistemology (or Logic). We require a general theory of the nature of our knowledge and the place of the various factors in it.\* Only by means of such a theory could we understand the significance which is to be attached to such an idea as that of the Absolute; only by means of it could we estimate the importance of the various contradictions which arise in the world of experience. But it must be left to writers in metaphysical reviews to press this criticism home. Here we must now turn to the ethical side.

Goodness, according to Mr. Bradley, belongs to the world of appearance. It betrays its phenomenal character by its inner contradictions. There is a "radical vice" in all goodness (p. 414). This is brought out in various ways. The chief contradictions seem to be two. In the first place (p. 432), "that a man is to be

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\* Mr. Bradley's own "Logic" does not fully supply this want; and even if it did, his present work does not appear to be written with sufficient reference to that. I cannot here discuss the question whether if such a Logic or Epistemology had been written there would be anything left for Ontology. My own view is that nothing would be left except the working out of something akin to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature and Spirit.

judged by his inner will seems in the end undeniable. And, if such a doctrine contradicts itself and is inconsistent with the very notion of goodness, that will be an indication that the good is but appearance. . . . But . . . a will, after all, must do something and must be characterized by what it does; while, on the other hand, this very character of what it does must depend on that which is 'given' to it. And we shall have to choose between two fatal results; for either it will not matter what one does, or else something beyond and beside the bare 'will' must be admitted to be good."

The second contradiction, which is the one to which Mr. Bradley gives most attention, is that which comes out in the opposition between self-assertion and self-denial. He explains this opposition with great care. After rejecting the ordinary common-sense view of the antithesis, he sums up by saying (p. 417), "It is the essential nature of my self, as finite, equally to assert and, at the same time, to pass beyond itself; and hence the objects of self-sacrifice and of self-advancement are each equally mine. . . . In self-assertion the organ considers first its own development, and for that purpose it draws material from the common life of all organs. But in self-sacrifice the organ aims at realizing some feature of the life larger than its own, and is ready to do this at the cost of injury to its own existence. It has foregone the idea of a perfection, individual, rounded, and concrete. It is willing to see itself abstract and mutilated, over-specialized, or stunted, or even destroyed. But this actual defect it can make up ideally by an expansion beyond its special limits and by an identification of its will with a wider reality. Certainly the two pursuits, thus described, must in the main coincide and be one. The whole is furthered most by the self-seeking of its parts, for in these alone the whole can appear and be real. And the part again is individually bettered by its action for the whole, since thus it gains the supply of that common substance which is necessary to fill it. But, on the other hand, this general coincidence is only general, and assuredly there are points at which it ceases. And here self-assertion and self-sacrifice begin to diverge, and each to acquire its distinctive character."

Now, that both these antitheses come up in the sphere of morality seems to me unquestionable. Indeed, they are closely connected with one another. We may state them briefly in this way. Both our moral judgments and our conceptions of the moral end present

themselves naturally in two distinct ways, which we may roughly describe as subjective and objective respectively. We judge a man's will, and we also judge the objects which he achieves. Again, we consider the moral end to involve a personal condition, and we also consider it to involve a state of the world. Now, in each of these two cases it is possible to lay the emphasis either on the one side or on the other,—*i.e.*, either on the subjective side or on the objective side; but in neither case can the one side be conceived as existing without the other. A perfectly good will must be a will issuing in acts that tend to the development of a perfectly harmonious world. Similarly, a perfect form of personal development could exist only within a world that is perfectly developed. It is only so long as the objects with which we are dealing remain imperfect that there is any conflict between the two sides on which it is possible to regard them. A will may be commendable which issues in foolish actions, and actions may be beneficial which issue from an impure will. A life like that which Matthew Arnold ascribes to Goethe as the "physician of the iron age," standing above the stream of "headlong fate," and enjoying the happiness only of knowing its inevitable course,\* may be regarded as a type of personal development in the midst of inharmonious conditions; while, on the other hand, the wretchedness and vice of a few individuals may seem little more than a foil to the glory of an age of great achievements. But it is not so, as Mr. Bradley would say, "in the Absolute;"† and I venture to think, also, that it is not so in any true conception of what is meant by goodness. Any real ideal of goodness must involve both the inner and the outer, both the subjective and the objective, in perfect harmony with each other. Now, if this is so, then the mere fact that in an imperfectly developed condition the two sides may be opposed, does not imply any ultimate contradiction in the conception of goodness. An athlete may develop his arms but not his legs. In an imperfectly developed physique there may be a certain

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\* "And he was happy, if to know  
 Causes of things, and far below  
 His feet to see the lurid flow  
 Of terror, and insane distress,  
 And headlong fate, be happiness."

This is, of course, taken from Lucretius.

† "It all comes right in the Absolute" is the characteristic refrain throughout Mr. Bradley's volume.

opposition between these ; but it does not follow that there is any contradiction in the ideal of a perfect human body, which would necessarily involve both. If there is any truth in this view, then the oppositions to which Mr. Bradley calls attention do not represent ultimate speculative contradictions in the conception of goodness, but only practical difficulties in the way of the realization of goodness in an imperfect state. Certainly there is often a practical opposition between purity of heart and practical effectiveness in external acts, between the realization of an individual character, with its circle of particular interests, and surrender to a whole recognized as higher. Such practical difficulties as these were discussed, for instance, in a very able paper by Mrs. Bryant in a recent number of this JOURNAL,\* and there can be no doubt that they are of great importance with reference to the art of conduct ; but, unless they imply an ultimate contradiction in the ideal aimed at, they can hardly be said to have any important speculative significance ; and Mr. Bradley does not appear to have proved that they do involve any such contradiction. If the difficulties are merely practical, they are, on the whole, of the same order as those that arise with reference to the pursuit of different ends in life,—*e.g.*, science and politics, religion and art, etc. Often a “choice of Hercules” between such competing aims has as much practical significance as one that may fairly be characterized as one between the self and a larger whole (a characterization which has, in any case, only a relative justification).

It seems to me that Mr. Bradley’s treatment of this whole question is rendered unsatisfactory by the fact that he has given no systematic account of what is to be understood by self. In Chapter IX., indeed, he has some interesting statements on different senses in which the term is used, but the connection between these different senses does not seem to be adequately brought out.† This question, however, is mainly of metaphysical importance, and, in any case, our limits will not permit any discussion of it here.

I may add, in conclusion, that Mr. Bradley’s general view of

\* Vol. III., No. 3, pp. 308–323.

† Mr. Bradley’s view (p. 95 *et seq.*) of the self as a “construction,” seems to me to be one that can commend itself, at most, only to empirical Psychology. If he had worked out a complete Epistemology (or Logic), a different view of the self as a self-transcending unity would, I think, have become necessary. His view on this point, as on some others, seems to be unduly influenced by Herbart.

goodness seems to me to result from what may be described as his statical conception of the Absolute. Goodness evidently belongs to the process of spiritual life, to the struggle towards the ideal of perfect harmony; and if the Absolute exists only in a state of repose, goodness must suffer the condemnation of all mere appearance. But if it is the nature of the Absolute to reveal itself in a spiritual process, goodness may perhaps claim to be its highest manifestation. At any rate, it does not seem to be proved that the ideal to which goodness points involves any ineradicable vice.

This review cannot but be felt to be miserably inadequate to the work criticised; but enough has probably been said to make it apparent that the book is one of supreme interest and importance to the student of ethics as well as to the student of metaphysics. I could have wished to add something on several other points, such as the doctrine of immortality, the relation of religion to morals, the significance of art, etc., on all of which Mr. Bradley has some very interesting remarks; but I must content myself with commending his discussions on these subjects to the attention of philosophical students. I may say, generally, of Mr. Bradley's book (parodying one of his own oracular utterances) that the work as a whole is unsatisfactory, but every particular thing in it is most delightful. The style, though often paradoxical, is singularly bright and attractive. It is hardly too much to say that the book is altogether the most important independent work on metaphysics that has ever been written in English.

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**ETHICS.** An Introductory Manual for the Use of University Students. By F. Ryland, M.A., author of "A Hand-book of Psychology," etc. London: George Bell & Sons, 1893. Pp. x, 220.

This book contains chapters on the Scope and Method of Ethics; on Good, Happiness, and Perfection; on Right, Obligation, and Duty; Hedonistic and Intuitionist Theories; Ethical Psychology; the Relation of Ethics to Theology and Law; and the Classification of Virtues. The final chapter gives a brief sketch of English Ethical Theories; and the book concludes with a useful bibliographical appendix, and a reprint of the ethical questions in the London Pass Papers from 1883 to 1892. The general arrangement